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This paper examines the effects of group identity in the credit market. Exploiting the quasi-
random assignment of first-time borrowers to loan officers of a large Albanian lender, we test 
for  own-gender  bias  in  the  loan  officer-borrower  match.  We  find  that  borrowers  pay  on 
average 29 basis points higher interest rates when paired with a loan officer of the other sex. 
The results indicate the presence of a taste-based rather than a statistical bias, as borrowers’ 
likelihood of going into arrears is independent of loan officer gender. Ending up with an 
opposite-sex loan officer also affects demand for credit, with borrowers being 11.5 percent 
less likely to return for a second loan. The bias is more pronounced when the social distance, 
as proxied by difference in age between the loan officer and the borrower, increases and when 
financial market competition declines. This is consistent with theories that predict a taste-
based bias to be stronger when the psychological costs of being biased are lower and the 
discretion in setting interest rates is higher. Taken together, the findings suggest that own-
gender preferences can have substantial welfare effects. 
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1  Introduction 
Group identity in the form of family, ethnicity, and gender is a powerful predictor of social 
preferences  (Akerlof  and  Kranton,  2000;  Chen  and  Li,  2009;  Benjamin  et  al.,  2010).  In 
particular, people generally favor in-group over out-group members. Favoritism based on, for 
example,  gender  identity  can  lead  to  inefficient  transactions  and/or  lost  opportunities. 
However, gender similarity may also entail trust, reciprocity, and efficiency due to shared 
norms and understandings. In this paper, we examine one important form of group identity, 
gender, and the consequences of own-gender preferences for outcomes in the credit market. 
Credit  transactions  rely  heavily  on  the  interaction  between  loan  officers  and 
borrowers. Microcredit is a case in point, with most clients being small and opaque, leaving 
the lending decision at the discretion of the loan officer. If bank officers and borrowers share 
gender identity, this could improve efficiency through a better understanding of the clients’ 
particular circumstances. For example, female loan officers may better appreciate the ability 
of  female  entrepreneurs  in  terms  of  completing  their  project  and/or  repaying  the  debt. 
Conversely, a gender bias can also generate unfair pricing. While access to formal sources of 
credit is often described as the main obstacle for the poor, the typically high interest rates for 
microloans can be a deterrence factor, too. Recent research shows that poor borrowers are 
very sensitive to small changes in interest rates (Karlan and Zinman, 2008). If a gender bias in 
the relationship between loan officers and borrowers results in higher interest rates, this may 
have negative repercussions not only for the cost of credit, but also for take up of loans by 
poor borrowers. 
Using a large dataset of loan transactions from a microcredit lender in Albania, we 
study if there is  a bias  against borrowers of the opposite  gender by their respective loan 
officer and the consequences of this bias for take up of loans. In particular, we assess if 
borrowers  pay  higher  interest  rates  when  matched  with  an  opposite-sex  loan  officer  and  
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whether this has an effect on the take up of additional loans from the same lender. As our data 
include information on both the price and the loan performance in terms of arrears, we are 
able to distinguish between statistical bias (Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 1973), which implies higher 
interest rates for riskier borrowers, and taste-based bias or prejudice (Becker, 1957), which 
implies higher interest rates independent of the level of riskiness. A better understanding of 
which  type  of  bias  is  operative  has  important  implications  for  policy.  Prejudice,  being 
inconsistent with profit maximization, should motivate policymakers to promote competition-
enhancing strategies as well as anti-discrimination literacy programs. Statistical bias, often 
consistent with profit maximization, should motivate policymakers to consider other policies 
to support disadvantaged minorities. 
Estimating the effect of own-gender preferences presents two main challenges. First, if 
male or female borrowers with certain characteristics are more likely to be assigned the same 
or opposite-sex loan officers, the true effect of loan officer gender would be biased. Second, if 
unobserved borrower traits are correlated with borrower gender, and if these can be observed 
by the loan officers but not by the researchers, it is not clear whether a significant coefficient 
on gender is due to a loan officer bias or the unobservable traits. 
We address these issues by exploiting a random component of the institutional setting: 
the fact that first-time borrowers are arbitrarily assigned to their respective loan officer, with 
the  sector  of  activity  being  the  only  factor  driving  assignment  to  a  specific  officer. 
Conditional on sector, the random assignment of borrowers to loan officers ensures that the 
unobservable borrower characteristics are the same across all loan officers, regardless of loan 
officer gender. In particular, we employ a difference-in-differences strategy and compare the 
difference  in  outcomes  (for  example,  the  interest  rate)  for  male  and  female  borrowers  
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obtaining  a  loan  from  a  male  loan  officer  to  the  difference  between  male  and  female 
borrowers obtaining a loan from a female loan officer.
1 
Our  estimates  provide  convincing  evidence  of  an  own-gender  preference,  with 
important repercussions for the subsequent loan demand.
2 Specifically, borrowers assigned to 
loan officers of the opposite rather than their own sex pay on average 29 basis points higher 
interest rates. In addition, there is no evidence that the loan officer-borrower gender match 
predicts the likelihood of falling into arrears, allowing us to distinguish between taste-based 
and statistical bias. If borrowers paying a higher interest rate were more likely to fall into 
arrears, this would imply a statistical bias. As this is not the case, our results imply a loan 
officer-specific taste for gender bias: loan officers charge higher interest rates to borrowers of 
the other gender although there is no difference in ex-post riskiness (or arrear probability). 
Ending up with an opposite-sex loan officer also has a significant impact on take up of 
loans.  First-time  borrowers  matched  with  a  loan  officer  of  the  opposite  gender  and  who, 
consequently, had to pay higher interest rates, are 6.9 percentage points less likely to return 
for a second loan. Given that 60 percent of the borrowers return to the same lender for a 
second loan, this is equivalent of an 11.5 percent decrease, a substantial economic effect. On 
top of paying higher interest rates on their first loans, there is thus a negative impact on the 
demand for credit. In addition, the negative effect of being matched with an opposite-sex loan 
officer is stronger in smaller branches, as measured by the number of loan officers employed 
per branch office. A possible interpretation is that smaller branches leave borrowers fewer 
options to find alternative loan officers, as the likelihood of being matched with the same 
opposite-sex loan officer is higher when returning for a second loan. 
                                                 
1  The  identifying  assumption  of  the  difference-in-differences  estimator  requires  that  the  unobservable 
characteristics are the same in the two differences. 
2 This may be due to either male or female (or both) favoring borrowers of their own gender, or disfavoring those 
of the other gender.  
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To better understand some of the possible mechanisms driving the taste-based bias, we 
examine heterogeneous  outcomes related to our findings. We show that the effect on the 
interest rate partially can be explained by loan officer and borrower age. In particular, loan 
officers younger than the median (loan officer age) charge higher interest rates when matched 
with an opposite-sex borrower. Meanwhile, above median-aged borrowers pay higher interest 
rates when interacting with a loan officer of the opposite gender. One interpretation of these 
results is the concept of social distance. Consistent with studies of cognitive behavior, there is 
a psychological cost involved in being biased that increases in cases where it is easier for the 
biased party to relate to the individual being biased against (Goodwin et al., 2000; Blair, 
2002). For example, a male loan officer may have stereotype beliefs about women. However, 
if he interacts with a female borrower of similar age, he is more likely to identify with her 
and, hence, experience a higher cost coming from the bias. Meanwhile, mistreating someone 
of  the  opposite  sex  that  is  older  (and,  hence,  quite  different)  could  be  associated  with  a 
smaller loss of utility. 
A  second,  complementary,  mechanism  is  that  the  bias  is  more  pronounced  in 
situations when loan officers have additional discretion in setting interest rates. Specifically, 
we measure discretion in terms of competition from other financial institutions. While low 
competition per se has a statistically insignificant (although positive) effect on the bias, it has 
a substantial impact once we focus on below-median aged loan officers. The bias is stronger 
for  this  category  of  loan  officers  when  there  is  less  competition.  This  is  consistent  with 
theories predicting that competition can erode a taste-based bias. For instance, Becker (1957) 
argues that discrimination is costly and harder to sustain in competitive environments.
3 
                                                 
3 In a developed-country setting, Black and Strahan (2001) and Levine et al. (2010) also find that discrimination 
against  female  and  minority-race  employees  fell  in  the  U.S.  after  a  branch  deregulation  resulted  in  higher 
competition.  
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Taken  together,  the  results  indicate  that  own-gender  preferences  have  non-trivial 
welfare effects for consumers (higher interest rates and lower take up) and providers of credit 
(lower long-run profits through diminished demand).
4 We do not find any positive effects of 
within-group matching of borrowers and loan officers. 
This paper speaks to several literatures. First, while there is no research explicitly 
examining the existence of a gender bias in microfinance, Karlan and Zinman’s (2008) study 
is especially relevant for the present analysis. Using experimental field data from a South 
African lender, where the interest rate offers were randomized, Karlan and Zinman show that 
clients were sensitive to interest rate changes, in particular to increases in price above the 
lender’s standard rates. In light of the interest rate differential identified in our paper, Karlan 
and  Zinman’s  finding  suggests  that  a  gender  bias-induced  price  gap  may  have  important 
effects on credit take up. This is indeed what we find. 
Second, our paper also contributes to the empirical literature examining poor peoples’ 
barriers to credit by identifying the existence of asymmetric information in the credit market 
(Karlan  and  Zinman,  2009).  It  further  links  to  the  work  looking  at  mechanisms  that  can 
improve access to finance, such as social capital (Karlan, 2007; Feigenberg et al., 2011) and 
joint liability (Giné and Karlan, 2011). The setting of the current study, a for-profit lender in 
Albania,  extending  credit  under  individual  liability  also  fits  the  pattern  of  the  second 
generation  of  microcredit  (Armendáriz  and  Morduch,  2005;  Karlan  and  Morduch,  2009) 
which has evolved in the direction of more traditional retail and small business lending. 
Third,  while  there  are  studies  looking  at  own-race  preferences  in  police  behavior 
(Donohue and  Levitt, 2001), in judicial sentencing (Welch et al., 1988) in the workplace 
                                                 
4 Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to construct precise measures of short-term profits because the bank 
does not collect the necessary information on actual repayments, the exact cost per loan, or the loan recoveries in 
case a loan defaults. Also, we would not be able to trace any recovered amounts back to the loan officers in our 
dataset, since the loan responsibility switches to a special loan recovery department once a loan is in arrears for 
more than 60 days. In addition, we do not have information about the gender of the people working in the loan 
recovery department.  
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(Stoll et al., 2004), and in sports (Price and Wolfers, 2010; Parsons et al., 2011), our paper is 
the first that seeks to account for an own-gender bias in lending. More generally, there is a 
literature  documenting  biases  in  credit  markets,  predominately  using  U.S.  data  on  either 
mortgage (Munnell et al., 1996; Berkovec et al., 1998; Ladd, 1998; Ross and Yinger, 2002; 
Han, 2004) or small business lending (Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo, 1998; Blanchflower et al., 
2003,  Blanchard  et  al.,  2008;  Bellucci  et  al.,  2010).
5  While  these  studies  on  minority  or 
gender bias have their merit, they suffer from two main shortcomings. First, as both statistical 
and taste-based bias can imply higher rejection rates for minority clients, it is often not clear 
what type of bias is being identified (see Berkovec et al., 1998 and Han, 2004 for exceptions 
though).
6 Second, and more importantly, existing work does not contain all the characteristics 
that lenders observe when approving the loans and setting the contract terms. Hence, one can 
never be sure that the loan applicants being compared are truly similar from the loan officers' 
perspective. As a consequence, any measured differences in outcomes could be attributed to 
these factors unobserved by the researcher. Using the quasi-random assignment of borrowers 
to  loan  officers  in  our  sample  allows  us  to  address  these  shortcomings.  Our  dataset  also 
permits  for  a  cleaner  test  of  an  interest  rate  gap  across  borrower  gender  as  we  have 
information on loan performance.
7 Moreover, previous work does not combine supply and 
demand-side analysis, that is, the effect of the gender bias on take up of financial services. 
Finally, this paper fits into a small but growing literature examining the importance of 
loan officers in lending stressing long-term relationships, compensation schemes, loan officer 
                                                 
5 For a survey of this literature, see Bellucci et al. (2010). 
6 Becker (1993) writes (referring to influential work by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston [Munnell et al., 
1996]) that studies trying to identify a gender bias require examining not only credit denial, but also the default, 
interest charges, late payments, and other determinants of the loans profitability. 
7 This is of particular importance as variation in interest rates may simply be driven by different degrees of risk 
associated with loans given to borrowers of the same or opposite gender that materialize ex-post. Though we are 
able to measure only ex-post risk, and borrowers’ risk behavior can be influenced by the interest rate, this would 
actually bias our estimations towards  finding a  higher arrear probability among borrowers  matched to loan 
officers of the other gender.  
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rotation, and loan officer gender for loan performance (Agarwal and Wang, 2009; Hertzberg 
et al., 2010; Beck et al., 2011; Drexler and Schoar, 2011). 
In the next section we provide institutional background information about our lender 
and the loan process, outline our methodology, and describe the data. Section three presents 
the  main  empirical  results,  while  section  four  explores  different  mechanisms  that  help 
interpret our results. Section five concludes. 
 
2  Data and identification strategy 
This section provides background information about the lender, our identification strategy, as 
well as a first look at the data, including descriptive statistics. 
 
2.1   Institutional background information 
We use loan-level data  from a large for-profit  commercial lender serving individuals and 
small-  and  medium-sized  enterprises  in  Albania.  The  dataset  includes  nearly  8,000  loans 
given by the lender over the period January 1996 to December 2006. In addition, our data 
contains information on 279 loan officers and covers 21 branches of the bank. While the 
lender  clearly  focuses  on  the  low-income  and  microenterprise  segment,  financial 
sustainability and therefore profitability is its primary goal. 
Loan officers working for this lender have discretion on the rejection and approval of 
a loan application as well as setting the interest rate. The loan officer that originates a certain 
loan is also in charge of monitoring the repayment behavior of the borrower. If a loan is in 
arrears for more than 30 days, the loan officer intensifies monitoring, for instance, by calling 
the borrower to inquire about the reasons for repayment delay. When a loan is in arrears for 
more than 60 days, it is transferred to a special loan recovery department and, thus, a new 
loan officer. We can therefore follow the relationship between a borrower and loan officer  
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from approval over loan condition setting to its performance in terms of arrears up to 60 days, 
but not beyond that point in time as we lack information about the gender of the loan officers 
working in the loan recovery department. 
Assignment of borrowers to loan officers is based on the availability of loan officers in 
the respective branch when the borrower arrives.
8 Specifically, first-time borrowers cannot 
freely choose a loan officer, barring an assignment based on any observable (for example, 
gender) or unobservable characteristic (for example, ability). Loan officers, however, may 
specialize in certain business sectors. For instance, it is more likely that a borrower working 
in the transportation business ends up with a loan officer with previous experience in handling 
borrowers  from  this  business  sector.  Since  male  and  female  loan  officers  or  borrowers 
potentially specialize in certain sectors, this needs to be accounted for. The next subsection 
outlines our identification strategy and how we account for the potential loan officer and 
borrower specialization in certain business sectors. 
 
2.2  Identification strategy 
To study the impact of the interaction between loan officer and borrower gender on borrower 
outcomes,  we  exploit  the  essentially  random  assignment  of  first-time  borrowers  to  loan 
officers. In a framework analogous to the difference-in-differences estimation, we compare 
the difference in outcomes (interest rate, arrear probability, and take up of a second loan) for 
male  and  female  borrowers  obtaining  a  loan  from  a  male  loan  officer  to  the  difference 
between male and female borrowers obtaining a loan from a female loan officer. 
The identifying assumption is that the difference between male and female borrowers 
screened and monitored by male loan officers is similar to the difference between male and 
female  borrowers  screened  and  monitored  by  female  loan  officers,  controlling  for  the 
                                                 
8 All loan officers work full-time, so that it does not matter which day of the week a borrower arrives.   
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respective sector of activity of the borrower. Hence, while male and female borrowers may 
differ systematically due to any number of unobservable factors, identification of the gender 
effect  will  be  robust  as  long  as  this  difference  is  constant  across  male  and  female  loan 
officers.
9 To address the possibility that it is not, we take two additional steps. First, we 
control for loan officer  fixed effects, allowing  us to compare male and female borrowers 
independent of the specific characteristics of any given loan officer (besides gender). Second, 
we also include a large number of observable contract-related, borrower, bank-branch, and 
(time-varying) loan officer characteristics. 
To formally test whether borrower assignment is random with respect to loan officer 
gender, we proceed in two complementary ways. First, we regress loan officer gender on 
borrower gender. This check shows whether female borrowers are more likely to be matched 
to a male loan officer conditioning on sector and time fixed effects. We also interact the 
female borrower dummy with the sector dummies to test for the matching within sectors, 
taking  into  account  that  loan  officers  might  specialize  in  certain  sectors.  Specifically,  we 
estimate 
(1)        , f f m e = + + + + j i s i s t ijts gl gb gb  
where glj is a gender dummy taking the value one for male loan officers, gbi is a gender 
dummy taking the value one for female borrowers,  s f  is sector dummy, and  t m  is a year 
dummy. In sum, the assumption is that  ( , ) 0 = j i Cov gl gb z , where  z is a vector of the relevant 
fixed effects. We cluster the standard errors eijts at the branch-by-sector level, as borrowers in 
the same sector and same branch are likely to share background characteristics as well as be 
exposed to the same loan officer and branch environment.  
                                                 
9 That is, we only require that the unobservable characteristics are the same in the two differences. As an indirect 
test of this assumption, we also show that the difference-in-differences in the observable traits are not significant.  
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The results in Table 1 show that within each business sector borrower gender cannot 
predict loan officer gender. In the first column, we estimate regression (1) not including any 
fixed  effects.  We  then  gradually  add  time,  sector,  and  sector-borrower  fixed  effects.  As 
column (4) of Table 1 reveals, once we account for specialization, borrower gender cannot 
explain loan officer gender. The point estimate, 0.001, is positive, insignificant, and close to 
zero. This suggests that the assignment of borrowers to loan officers is as good as random 
within the sectors. 
While we believe that this is the most stringent randomization test, we perform a 
second  check  where  we  verify  if  male  relative  to  female  borrowers  vary  in  their 
characteristics depending on whether they are matched with a loan officer of their own or the 
opposite  gender.  If  the  identifying  assumption  is  correct,  there  should  be  no  statistically 
significant difference-in-differences observed between male and female borrowers ending up 
with a male or female loan officer. We utilize the following regression: 
(2)      , b f f f m e = + + + + + + + ijts i j s i s j s i j t ijts y gb gl gb gl gb gl  
where  ijts y  is one of the relevant characteristics of borrower i contracting with loan officer j in 
year  t  in  sector  s,  with  the  other  variables  being  the  same  as  in  specification  (1).  The 
coefficient  b  indicates whether there is a difference between male and female borrowers 
screened  and  monitored  by  male  relative  to  female  loan  officers.  The  assumption  is  that
( , ) 0 = % i j Cov gbgl u z , where u is any other determinant of the outcome of interest  ijts y  and  % z  
is the vector of the relevant fixed effects. Specifically, we have socio-demographic borrower 
information  (civil  status,  employment  status:  that  is,  self-employed  or  –  at  least  partly  – 
employed wage earner, age, size of the borrower’s household, phone availability). The data 
also include information on the loan terms apart from the interest rate (applied loan size in 
U.S. Dollars [USD], applied loan maturity in days, availability of a personal, mortgage, or  
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chattel guarantee), the loan usage (working capital, fixed assets, a combination of the two, 
housing improvement, consumption, and “other”), and information on the financial status of 
the borrower’s business (total assets in USD, leverage). 
The differences in Table 2 suggest a random assignment of borrowers to loan officers 
of the same or opposite gender. Specifically, columns (3) and (6) display the t-statistic of the 
relative  difference  across  male  and  female  borrowers  for  male  and  female  loan  officers, 
respectively.  Finally,  column  (7)  reports  the  t-statistic  of  the  difference-in-differences 
estimate. While we find significant differences between male and female borrowers within the 
sub-groups  of  female  and  male  loan  officers,  only  household  size  and  civil  status  enter 
(weakly) significantly once we compare borrower-loan officer pairs conditional on sector, 
sector-borrower,  and  time  fixed  effects.  The  data  show  that  male  borrowers  form  part  of 
larger households, though the economic effect is small, and are more often married. None of 
the other observable differences are significant. Together, the results in Tables 1 and 2 lend 
credibility to our identification strategy. 
 
2.3   Sample composition and descriptive statistics 
When  analyzing  treatment  differences  we  focus  on  three  outcomes:  annual  interest  rate 
charged, the likelihood of going into arrears, and the likelihood of applying for a second loan 
with the lender. 
In  order  to  examine  potential  interest  rate  differentials  across  borrower  and  loan 
officer gender, we also analyze loan performance because differences in ex-post loan risk may 
explain why borrowers of different gender are charged different rates. Specifically, we define 
loan performance as the probability that a loan is in arrears for more than 30 days at any time 
over  the  life  of  the  loan  (hereafter  arrear  probability).  The  30  day  arrear  threshold  is  an 
important variable and its use as a risk/performance measure is quite common in microfinance  
12 
(the portfolio at risk of a microcredit lender is usually reported using this risk definition). 
Also, the lender increases the monitoring intensity once a loan is in arrears for more than 30 
days, for example by contacting the borrower more often on the phone or even visiting her. 
As a robustness check, we run all the arrear regressions using the 60 days in arrears definition 
with unchanged results. Using the internationally recognized definition of a default (90 days 
in  arrears  threshold),  is  not  feasible  in  our  case  since,  as  mentioned  above,  the  loan 
responsibility changes after 60 days and rests with a special loan recovery department. 
While the default probability could be endogenous to the interest rate, with higher 
interest  rates  pushing  the  borrower  towards  riskier  behavior  thus  undermining  repayment 
probability, this would bias our estimations towards finding a statistical rather than taste-
based bias. Specifically, if we find that borrowers matched to loan officers of the opposite 
gender are given higher interest rates, this could induce a higher arrear probability.
10 
For our regression analyses, we restrict the data in several ways. First, we focus on 
first-time borrowers. By studying the first loan application submitted by each borrower, we 
assume that borrowers and loan officers had neither a previous business relationship nor any 
knowledge of each other. The use of repeat loans is more problematic because borrowers 
already have experience with the lender and may select a certain loan officer type, inducing a 
systematic  bias.  In  addition,  the  effect  of  the  gender  bias  on  take  up  of  a  repeat  loan 
introduces a selection bias in the sample of repeat borrowers. Also, in the case of repeat 
borrowers, loan officers have historic information, which they can use when granting and 
monitoring the loan and deciding on loan conditionality. Focusing on the first loan by each 
loan  applicant  yields  the  cleanest  test  of  possible  gender-specific  interest  rate  and 
performance differentials. 
                                                 
10 It is possible, however, that loan officers of a certain gender exert different monitoring efforts across borrower 
gender. Hence, an increase in the arrear probability induced by an interest rate hike could be traded off against a 
higher monitoring effort on part of the loan officer charging the higher interest rate. This would not invalidate 
any results with regard to the own gender bias, but might explain why ex post arrear probabilities do not differ 
between the loan officer-borrower gender pairs.  
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Second, we drop loans with missing gender information on the borrower. For that 
purpose, we exclude loans by borrowers classified as legal entities in the database as we lack 
information on borrower gender. Third, we drop loans with amounts of less than 100 and 
more than 20,000 USD. While low values may be the result of miscoded entries we want to 
exclude  large  loans  that  do  not  fit  the  definition  of  small  individual  and  microloans.  In 
addition, we exclude loans with an unreasonable borrower age (younger than 18 or older than 
75 years). This reduces our sample to 7,885 loans for the baseline regression analysis. 
The descriptive statistics in Table 3 shows that 17 percent of the loans in the sample 
are  given  to  female  borrowers,  while  55  percent  are  managed  by  female  loan  officers.
11 
Around 50 percent in our sample are loans managed by an opposite-sex loan officer. The 
average interest rate is 14 percent and the interest rate is 30 basis points higher for male 
borrowers and 40 basis points higher for male loan officers. Five percent of loans go into 
arrears, with a lower likelihood for female borrowers (3.7 percent) and female loan officers 
(4.9 percent). 
 
3  Main findings 
This  section  first  presents  our  baseline  findings  for  the  interest  rates  and  the  arrear 
probability.





                                                 
11 The relatively high share of female loan officers working for the bank is in line with recent labor market 
statistics published by the Statistical Institute of Albania (2007) and the recent census, both showing that females 
are slightly overrepresented in financial institutions and in jobs similar to the job of a loan officer. 
12 While we have information on rejected loan applications, more than 95 percent of first-time applicants are 
granted a loan, yielding little variation to be exploited. When estimating cross-gender differences in an approval 
regression, however, we cannot find any evidence for the gender bias.  
14 
3.1   Baseline result 
To investigate whether there is an own-gender bias in lending, we use OLS to estimate the 
following specification 
(3)    0 , a b r f f f m h k e = + + + + + + + + + + + ijts i j i j s s i s j t c k ijt ijts O gb gl gb gb gl x  
where O is the outcome of interest (annual interest charged, likelihood of going into arrears, 
and likelihood of applying for a second loan),  , , , , r f m h  and k  are loan officer, sector, time, 
cohort,  and,  branch  dummies,  respectively.  The  parameter  x  is  a  vector  of  loan  officer, 
borrower, and loan characteristics, though as shown above,  i j gb gl  is orthogonal to x, and the 
consistency  of  b   does  not  depend  on  the  inclusion  of  the  covariates  in  the  model.  The 
subscripts i, j, k, s, and t denote borrower, loan officer, branch, sector, and year, respectively. 
We first examine the effect on interest rates and arrears. Interest Rate is the annual 
interest rate charged on the loan and Arrear is a dummy variable taking the value one if the 
loan has been in arrears for more than 30 days at any point during the loan. We use OLS for 
all three outcome variables, despite of Arrear being a binary variable because when using a 
non-linear model, we will lose loan officers that have not experienced any arrears on their 
loans, respectively, those who have only experienced arrears on their loans. Our findings, 
however,  are  confirmed  when  considering  the  coefficient  estimates  of  probit  models.  As 
before, we cluster the standard errors at the branch-by-sector level. 
The coefficient  b  estimates the impact of opposite-sex loan officers on a borrower’s 
interest rate (relative to own-gender loan officers). Put differently, it measures the differential 
effect of a female (male) borrower paired with a male (female) loan officer compared to a 
female  (male)  borrower  matched  with  a  female  (male)  loan  officer.  Table  4  presents  the 
findings using interest rates and arrear probability as dependent variables. The results in Panel 
A refer to the interest rate regressions and the results in Panel B to the arrear regressions.  
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The results in Panel A of Table 4 show a significant difference in interest rates paid by 
borrowers assigned to loan officers of their own gender compared to borrowers assigned to 
loan officers of the opposite sex. In column (1) of Panel A, we report the estimated coefficient 
without controls and fixed effects. The point estimate of 0.0026 is significant at the  five 
percent  level.  In  columns  (2)  through  (5)  we  add  (i)  loan  officer  (time-variant)  specific 
variables, (ii) borrower specific variables, (iii) cohort fixed effects, (iv) branch fixed effects, 
and (v) branch and sector-specific trend variables.
13 In column (6) of Panel A, we also include 
the  loan  characteristics  (approved  loan  amount,  approved  maturity).  These  are  arguably 
endogenous to the outcome of interest. However, the point estimate and the standard error 
stay  the  same.  The  coefficient  on  the  gender-gender  interaction  is  significant  in  all 
specifications at least at the 5 percent level. It implies that borrowers assigned to opposite-sex 
loan officers pay on average a 29 basis points higher interest rate compared to borrowers who 
are matched with loan officers of the same gender. 
Panel B of Table 4 shows that the identified interest rate differential is unjustified with 
respect to the arrear probability. The higher interest rates that borrowers pay when matched 
with a loan officer of the opposite gender could potentially be explained by the fact that they 
are riskier customers, which would indicate a statistical bias. The consistently insignificant 
coefficient estimate on  i j gb gl  clearly indicates that there is no difference between female 
(male) borrowers’ likelihood of falling into arrears, depending on whether they are screened 
and monitored by  a male (female) as opposed  to a female (male) loan officer.  Note that 
borrowers’ ex post risk behavior potentially could be influenced by the interest rate through a 
changed repayment burden. Since borrowers ending up with opposite-sex loan officers on 
average pay higher interest rates, this should actually bias our estimates toward finding a 
                                                 
13  We  control  for  branch-specific  trends,  as  branches  opened  up  during  our  period  and  may  have  evolved 
differently with respect to our outcome variables. We control for sector trends to take into account possible 
attitudinal changes specific to each sector that may drive our outcome variables.  
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higher arrear probability in these instances. However, the arrears are not affected by the loan 
officer-borrower gender match. 
In sum, the results support the existence of a taste-based, rather than a statistical bias, 
as  the  higher  interest  rates  paid  by  borrowers  when  matched  with  a  loan  officer  of  the 
opposite gender do not seem to be driven by a higher level of riskiness.
14 
 
3.2   Taste-based bias and loan take up 
Next we explore the consequences of the taste-based bias identified in the previous section on 
loan demand. This is an issue of great importance given the recent finding that poor borrowers 
are  sensitive  to  increases  in  interest  rates  (Karlan  and  Zinman,  2008).  In  line  with  these 
results, we expect that borrowers that are matched with an opposite sex loan officer and, thus, 
pay higher interest rates, will react by demanding less credit, that is, applying less often for a 
repeat loan with the same lender. 
Specifically, we examine the relationship between the likelihood of applying for a 
second loan, the loan officer matching, and the interest rate from the first loan. Overall, 60 
percent of all first-time borrowers came back to the institution for a second loan during our 
sample period. While a large number of these non-returning customers might be due to the 
usual attrition and the lack of need for further loans, we investigate whether part of it can be 
explained by the loan-officer match in the first loan. We define a dummy variable that takes 
on  value  one  if  the  borrower  returned  to  the  bank  for  at  least  one  more  time  and  zero 
otherwise. We account for the fact that borrowers might not come back to the bank because 
the maturity of their first loan lies beyond the end of our sample period (the problem of right 
censoring). Hence, we compute the average maturity of all loans, which is 563 days, and end 
our sample period on December 31, 2006, less 563 days for the test. This reduces the sample 
                                                 
14 We further tested for variation in the taste-based bias across the different business sectors but do not find any 
significant difference.  
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size  from  7,885  to  5,445  observations.
15  We  then  run  specification  (3)  with  a  dummy 
indicating whether a borrower returned to the bank as the dependent variable, including the 
controls and the fixed effects corresponding to model (V) in Table 4.
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The results in Table 5 show that borrowers that (i) were matched with a loan officer of 
the other gender and/or (ii) were charged a higher interest rate on their first loan, are less 
likely to apply for a second loan. The economic effects are substantial: being matched with a 
male (female) loan officer results in a 6.9 percent points lower likelihood of female (male) 
borrowers applying for a second loan. The impact of the gender mis-match on take-up is large 
given that only 60.3 percent of all first-time borrowers apply for a second loan. The results in 
column (2) suggest that the higher interest rate is an important reason of why borrowers 
matched to a loan officer from the opposite gender do not return; the interest rate charged on 
the first loan enters significantly, while the significance of  i j gb gl  drops to the 10 percent 
level. Column 3 investigates whether the interest rate acts as a mediating factor between the 
loan officer-borrower match and take up. To do this, we re-estimate the baseline specification 
by IV/2SLS, with i j gb gl  as the excluded instrument for the interest rate and the remaining 
interaction terms, the fixed effects, and the covariates as controls. The reasoning behind this 
specification is that it uses the gender pair as exogenous to derive the economic effect of the 
gender-induced interest rate hike. The impact on take up for borrowers ending up with an 
opposite-sex loan officer is significant at the ten percent level. The point estimate of 20.18 
implies  that  a  one  percentage  point  increase  in  the  interest  rate  reduces  take  up  by  20 
percentage  points.  In  unreported  regressions,  we  confirm  our  findings  for  a  sample  of 
borrowers that did not fall into arrears on their first loan, with coefficient estimates of almost 
the same size. 
                                                 
15 The results do not change if we use the median maturity instead of the mean maturity. We also re-ran the 
regressions of Table 4 and obtain the same results for this smaller sample. 
16 In some of the tests reported below we exclude the branch trends. This is necessary because otherwise the 
regressions include too many sparse indicator variables and it is impossible to compute the standard errors.  
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Overall, these findings suggest that beyond the cost impact that higher interest rates 
have for borrowers matched to a loan officer from the other gender, there is a negative effect 
of this taste-based bias on take-up rates. This supports findings by Karlan and Zinman (2008) 
on the interest rate sensitivity of loan take up and shows that the own-gender bias can have a 
significant impact on demand for credit by borrowers. 
Columns 4 and 5 provide additional evidence for the effect of the own-gender bias on 
take up. We conjecture that borrowers that were subject to the taste-based bias are less likely 
to return for a second loan in branches where the probability of being matched with the same 
(opposite-sex) loan officer is higher. In larger branches with many loan officers, there is a 
reasonable  chance  that  borrowers  might  be  matched  with  a  different  loan  officer  (due  to 
rotation or work load distribution) and hopefully of the same gender, so borrowers might be 
more enticed to return. In small branches, this is less likely. Specifically, for each year we 
divide the sample into bank branches with above or below the median number of loan officers 
(our  size  measure).  This  implies  that  we  explore  variation  in  terms  of  employees  across 
branches and time (allowing us to keep the branch fixed effects). Also, we confirm that our 
first randomization test [specification (1)] holds for the subsamples.
17 
Both column 4 and column 5 show a significant and negative effect of the gender 
mismatch  on  take  up  of  a  second  loan  for  branches  with  below  median  number  of  loan 
officers. The size of the coefficient is more than three times the size of the regression for the 
full sample, suggesting a large economic effect for small branches. A Wald test confirms that 
the coefficient estimates across the two regressions are significantly different from each other. 
When testing for an interest rate differential across branches of different size, we find a higher 
interest rate for borrowers matched with loan officers of the opposite gender for both small 
and large branches. Hence, while borrowers suffer from own-gender bias across branches of 
                                                 
17 Results for this and all other randomization tests for the subsamples are available on request from the authors.  
19 
all sizes, the repercussions of this bias for take-up of future loans can only be observed in 
small branches. We see this as additional evidence for our hypothesis of a negative impact of 
own-gender preference on take up, as borrowers are less likely to be matched with a different 
loan officer for the second loan in smaller branches with fewer loan officers. 
 
4  Mechanisms and channels of the taste-based bias 
The previous sections showed a significant own-gender bias in loan officers’ setting of the 
interest rate and the consequences of this bias for borrowers’ take up of additional loans with 
the lender. In what follows, we investigate two specific mechanisms and channels through 
which the own-gender bias may work. 
 
4.1   Social distance and the own-gender bias 
The first hypothesis that we explore is the idea that the bias varies with the social distance 
between the loan officer and the borrower. While loan officers may have stereotype beliefs 
about the opposite gender, consistent with studies of cognitive behavior, the bias can involve 
psychological costs that increase when the biased party is faced with counter-examples that 
are  conflicting  with  the  gender  stereotype  (Goodwin  et  al.,  2000;  Blair,  2002).  This  cost 
arguably rises in cases where it is easier for the biased party to relate to the individual being 
biased against. For example, a male loan officer may have stereotype beliefs about women. 
However, if he interacts with a female borrower of the same age, he is more likely to identify 
with  her  and,  hence,  experience  a  higher  psychological  cost  coming  from  the  bias. 
Meanwhile,  stereotyping  someone  of  the  opposite  sex  that  is  older  (and,  hence,  quite 
different) can be felt as less costly. Therefore, the bias is more pronounced when the social 
distance between the loan officer and the borrower increases. The concept of social distance  
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as a driver of the bias also implies that experience on the job per se should not matter, that is, 
the bias should be independent of the specific job experience. 
Consistent with our hypothesis, we anticipate that it is more difficult for young loan 
officers to relate to old borrowers as the social distance in this case is expected to increase.
18 
We test for this by dividing the sample according to the median loan officer age (24 years) 
and  to  the  median  borrower  age  (41  years).
19  We  then  run  the  baseline  regression  using 
interest rate and arrears as dependent variables separately for the resulting subsamples and test 
for significant difference across the samples.
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The results in columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 show that the own-gender bias is present 
in the case of older borrowers (above 41  years), with a statistically significant difference 
between the two regression coefficients at the 7 percent level according to the Wald test. The 
point estimate for the differential interest rate charged for older borrowers interacting with an 
opposite-sex  loan  officer  is  0.0041.  As  the  loan  officers  in  the  sample  are  considerably 
younger than the borrowers, this is in line with the prediction that the bias should be more 
pronounced if the social distance is bigger. Similarly, the results in columns (3) and (4) show 
that the bias is larger in the case of  younger loan officers (below 24 years), who charge 
considerably higher interest rates if matched with borrowers of the opposite gender, while 
older loan officers do not: the interest rate coefficient for  young loan officers, 0.0051, is 
significant  at  the  one  percent  level,  whereas  the  point  estimate  for  older  loan  officers  is 
insignificant,  positive,  and  close  to  zero  (the  Wald  test  of  difference  across  the  two 
coefficients confirm that they are significantly different at the five percent level). In addition, 
                                                 
18 We also split the sample according to other borrower and loan officer characteristics, but do not find any 
significant difference across groups. 
19 While we expect the effect to exist also in the case of older (above the median age) loan officers matched with 
younger (below the median age) borrowers, our sample does not permit us to test for this because the loan 
officers are on average much younger than the borrowers. Above median-aged loan officers are 28 years old 
while below-median aged borrowers are almost 33. This can be compared to the polar case reported above, 
where below median aged loan officers are 23 years old while above-median aged borrowers are about 50. 
20 As above, the identifying assumption for the two subsamples holds because the female gender dummy is 
insignificant when implementing the first randomization test [equation (1)].  
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the  differential  behavior  of  loan  officers  across  age  groups  is  not  related  to  their  work 
experience, as defined by the number of loan transactions handled at the time of each new 
loan contract. Specifically, columns (5) and (6) show no significant difference below and 
above  the  median  experience  (121  loans  handled).  These  results  demonstrate  that  work 
experience does not change loan officers’ taste for stereotyping, while closeness in age does. 
This provides further support to the conclusion that the bias is intrinsically motivated, rather 
than based on other considerations such as profit. 
The Panel B regressions do not show any significant differences in arrear probability 
across  borrowers  or  loan  officers  of  different  age  or  experience.  Thus,  the  bias  that  we 
identify cannot be justified in terms of a higher level of borrower riskiness. 
 
4.2   Competition and the own-gender bias 
We also conjecture that the bias varies with financial market  competition. Becker (1957) 
argues that a gender bias should be more pronounced when the degree of competition is low. 
Specifically, when there is little competition, loan officers have more discretion in expressing 
the  taste-based  bias  since  the  borrowers  have  fewer  outside  options  and,  hence,  less 
bargaining power. We therefore expect the bias to be more pronounced when competition 
decreases.
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To explore the role of competition, we map additional competition data to our dataset. 
Specifically, we retrieved information on the universe of registered bank branches and the 
population in Albania by region and time, and merged this with our loan-level data. The data 
(provided by the Albanian central bank) are available for the years 2004-2006, thus covering 
roughly 75 percent of the loan transactions, reducing the sample size to 5,704 observations. 
                                                 
21 The reasoning is analogous to the argument developed in Parsons et al. (2011), who show that an own-race 
bias associated with baseball referees is stronger in situations where it is less likely that the bias is discovered, in 
their context, in baseball arenas with cameras that document the decisions taken by the referees.  
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We then construct a competition proxy, defined as the number of bank branches per capita by 
region and year, and divide the sample according to the observations from regions with a 
branch-ratio  below  and  above  the  median  (as  defined  by  the  regions  covered  by  the  21 
branches in our data). The regions below (above) the median are the regions where we expect 
that competition from other financial institutions is low (high). We also include the absolute 
number of bank institutions in a specific region and year as an additional control. These sub-
sample regressions can only be run for the interest rate and arrears variables, but not to test 
differences in take up as the sample size becomes too small.
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Table 7 shows that the taste-based bias varies as theory would predict. In order to 
identify our effects, we explore time variation in the ratio of branches per capita. First, we test 
for  differences  across  branches  in  regions  with  different  degrees  of  competition.  While 
columns (1) and (2) show that less competition increases the size of the taste-based bias, the 
difference  is  not  statistically  significant  across  branches  in  areas  with  high  and  low 
competition. However, when we focus on the sample of young loan officers (that is, below the 
median  age  of  24),  we  find  evidence  of  a  taste-based  bias  in  branches  that  face  low 
competition from other banks [columns (3) and (4)]. The coefficient in the regression for 
branches in high-competition areas is not only insignificant (which might be due to the small 
number of observations) but also smaller in magnitude than in the regressions for branches in 
low-competition areas.
23 The last two columns in Table 7 show a similar difference when we 
focus on small branches as defined by the number of loan officers employed per branch. We 
find that loan officers are more likely to exercise the taste-based bias in small branches with 
little competition, with the effect being three times as large in these cases, as compared to 
smaller branches that face above median competition. The point estimate in the former case is 
                                                 
22 In the case of take up, our sample is restricted by the sample period – because we are unable to observe the 
second loan take up for first-time borrower in 2006 and late 2005, while the competition data only includes 2004 
through 2006. 
23 Focusing on above-median age borrowers and splitting the sample according to competition does not yield any 
significant differences; results are available on request.   
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0.0097 and significant at the one percent level, while it drops to 0.0031 in the case of above 
median competition. The regressions in Panel B show, as before, that there are no differences 
in arrears across borrower-loan officer matches, regardless of the sample split. 
Together,  these  results  confirm  that  competition  or  the  lack  thereof  is  one  of  the 
drivers of the own-gender bias, though only in conjunction with social distance as proxied by 
age. Young loan officers are more likely to charge higher interest rates to borrowers of the 
opposite gender in branches that face little competition from other financial institutions. 
 
5  Conclusion 
Our results suggest that own-gender preferences affect credit market outcomes. In particular, 
using a rich loan-level dataset from an Albanian microcredit lender, this paper has three main 
findings. First, we identify an own-gender bias in the setting of interest rates in microlending. 
Specifically, borrowers matched with a loan officer of the other gender pay, on average, 26 to 
29 basis points higher interest rates than if matched with a loan officer of the same sex. 
Second,  the  bias  we  identify  is  taste  based  rather  than  statistical,  as  there  is  no  ex-post 
difference in riskiness across borrowers matched to a loan officer of the same or the opposite 
gender. Third, the own-gender bias has negative repercussions for take up of further loans. 
Borrowers matched to loan officers of the opposite sex are 6.9 percentage points less likely to 
return for another loan from the same lender. 
We also investigate the sources of the taste-based own-gender bias. We argue and 
show that the bias is more pronounced when the social distance between the loan officer in 
charge  of  the  loan  and  the  borrower  is  larger.  In  addition,  the  bias  increases  when  loan 
officers have more discretion (as measured by financial market competition) in setting interest 
rates, i.e., applying the bias.  
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Understanding in-group identity, in the form of own-gender preferences, has at least 
two  implications  for  the  functioning  of  the  credit  market.  First,  identity  may  affect  the 
organizational  design  of  financial  institutions.  Specifically,  matching  loan  officers  to 
borrowers  of  the  same  gender  can  have  repercussions  by  reducing  taste-based  biases. 
Similarly, the pairing of loan officers and borrowers according to proxies such as age may 
also help eliminate existing biases. Second, from a policy perspective, our findings point to 
the possibility that financial market competition can be a powerful tool in dampening the 
biases of loan officers, and, ultimately, banks, against borrowers of a certain gender.  
25 
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Table 1: Test of random assignment 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Borrower gender  -0.1103***  -0.0877***  -0.0306  0.0011 
   (0.0364)  (0.0275)  (0.0188)  (0.0492) 
  
Time FE  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sector FE  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Sector by borrower FE  No  No  No  Yes 
  
Observations  7,891  7,891  7,891  7,891 
In this table we regress the loan officer gender on the borrower gender. The dependent variable is a dummy 
variable that takes on value one if the loan officer is male. The main dependent variable is a dummy variable that 
takes on value one if the borrower is female. In column (1) we do not include any further control variable. The 
column (2) regression adds time fixed effects, the column (3) regression further adds sector fixed effects, and the 
column (4) regressions adds sector-borrower fixed effects. Standard errors that are clustered at the branch-sector 
level are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 2: Test for differences in borrower characteristics 









borrowers  t-statistic  t-statistic 
Variable  (1)  (2) 
(3) = (1) - 
(2)  (4)  (5) 
(6) = (4) - 
(5) 
(7) = (3) - 
(6) 
Age applicant  41.30  41.99  0.26  40.88  41.46  1.14  0.79 
Wage earner  0.46  0.76  1.97*  0.75  0.91  0.59  1.59 
Civil status  0.91  0.77  -2.65***  0.89  0.73  -2.75***  1.97* 
Household size  5.45  4.77  -7.51***  5.23  4.50  -3.91***  2.09** 
Phone 
availability  0.95  0.92  0.14  0.93  0.91  0.92  -0.29 
Applied amount  2,990  2,675  -0.98  3,193  2,769  0.03  -0.87 
Applied maturity  585  580  -1.51  625  613  -0.02  0.04 
Total assets  26,516  27,577  -2.59**  28,204  25,688  1.26  0.88 
Leverage  0.02  0.02  4.13***  0.02  0.02  -2.45***  -0.25 
Personal 
guarantee  0.11  0.16  0.69  0.19  0.18  -0.08  0.28 
Mortgage 
guarantee  0.08  0.10  1.96*  0.15  0.13  -0.52  0.02 
Chattel guarantee  0.98  0.96  -1.91*  0.95  0.94  -0.30  0.53 
Working Capital  0.10  0.08  0.90  0.08  0.03  -1.59  0.91 
Fixed Assets  0.48  0.27  -2.48**  0.27  0.12  -0.24  -1.13 
Mixed  0.15  0.10  0.96  0.03  0.02  1.69*  -0.21 
Housing 
Improvement  0.16  0.29  0.44  0.38  0.46  -1.32  0.07 
Consumption  0.11  0.26  2.35**  0.24  0.35  2.33**  0.74 
Others  0.00  0.00  n.a.  0.00  0.00  -1.07  -1.46 
                       
Observations  3,057  464  3,521  3,524  846  4,370  7,891 
This table contains a test of difference in observable borrower characteristics using a difference-in-difference 
approach.  Columns  (1)  and  (2)  show  raw  means  for  a  set  of  borrower  characteristics  of  male  and  female 
borrowers that are matched with male loan officers. Column (3) shows the t-statistic of a test of difference of the 
respective borrower characteristic between male and female borrowers with male loan officers. Columns (4) and 
(5) show raw means of male and female borrowers that are matched with female loan officers. Column (6) shows 
the  t-statistic of a test of difference of the respective borrower characteristic between male and female borrowers 
with  female  loan  officers.  Column  (7)  shows  the  t-statistic  of  a  test  of  differences-in-differences  for  the 
respective borrower characteristic. The t-statistics in columns (3) and (6) are estimated conditioned on time, 
sector, and sector-borrower fixed effects. The t-statistics in column (7) are estimated additionally conditioning 
on sector-loan officer fixed effects. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.  
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Variable  Mean  SD  Median  Male borrower  Female borrower  Male LO  Female LO 
Interest rate  0.14  0.02  0.14  0.14  0.14  0.14  0.14 
Arrears  0.05  0.23  0.00  0.06  0.04  0.06  0.05 
Female  0.17  0.37  0.00  n.a.  n.a.  0.13  0.19 
Civil status  0.87  0.33  1.00  0.90  0.75  0.89  0.86 
Household size  5.21  1.60  5.00  5.33  4.59  5.36  5.09 
Age applicant  41.17  10.29  41.13  41.07  41.65  41.39  40.99 
Wage earner  0.65  0.48  1.00  0.61  0.86  0.50  0.78 
Total assets  27,244  82,355  16,367  27,420  26,359  26,656  27,718 
Leverage  0.02  0.07  0.00  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02 
Applied amount  3,038  2,955  2,086  3,099  2,736  2,948  3,111 
Approved amount  2,727  2,861  1,961  2,780  2,458  2,641  2,796 
Approved maturity  563  288  540  564  559  542  581 
Phone availability  0.94  0.25  1.00  0.94  0.92  0.94  0.93 
Personal guarantee  0.16  0.36  0.00  0.16  0.17  0.12  0.19 
Mortgage guarantee  0.11  0.32  0.00  0.11  0.12  0.08  0.14 
Chattel guarantee  0.96  0.19  1.00  0.97  0.95  0.98  0.95 
Destination Working Capital  0.08  0.28  0.00  0.09  0.05  0.10  0.07 
Destination Fixed Assets  0.33  0.47  0.00  0.37  0.17  0.45  0.24 
Destination Mixed  0.08  0.27  0.00  0.08  0.05  0.14  0.03 
Destination Housing Improvement  0.30  0.46  0.00  0.28  0.40  0.18  0.40 
Destination Consumption  0.20  0.40  0.00  0.18  0.32  0.13  0.26 
Destination Others  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Production  0.18  0.38  0.00  0.20  0.07  0.31  0.07 
Transport  0.15  0.36  0.00  0.17  0.05  0.17  0.13 
Construction  0.67  0.47  1.00  0.63  0.88  0.52  0.80 
Female LO  0.55  0.50  1.00  0.54  0.65  n.a.  n.a. 
Age LO  25.54  4.53  23.89  25.62  25.13  26.74  24.58 
Applications per LO  165.49  159.16  121.00  165.64  164.76  159.94  169.97 
This table shows descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation (SD), median) for the main dependent variables interest rate and arrears and the main control variables used in the 
regression analyses. The columns (1)-(3) show the values for the entire sample, columns (4) and (5) the means for male and female borrowers, and colums (6) and (7) the means for 
male and female loan officers.  
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Table 4: Baseline results 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Panel A: Interest rate   
Gender*Gender  0.0026**  0.0026**  0.0027***  0.0027***  0.0029***  0.0029*** 
   (0.0011)  (0.0012)  (0.0010)  (0.0009)  (0.0013)  (0.0013) 
    
Adjusted R-squared  0,4407  0,5259  0,5266  0,5431  0,5509  0,5509 
Observations  7.891  7.885  7.885  7.885  7.885  7.885 
    
Panel B: Arrears   
Gender*Gender  0,0080  0,0077  0,0100  0,0100  0,0099  0,0099 
   (0.0138)  (0.0161)  (0.0168)  (0.0165)  (0.0140)  (0.0140) 
    
Adjusted R-squared  0,0718  0,0833  0,0844  0,0844  0,0841  0,0841 
Observations  7.891  7.885  7.885  7.885  7.885  7.885 
    
    
Loan officer fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Loan officer-specific variables  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Borrower-specific variables  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Branch fixed effects  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Branch and sector trends  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Loan characteristics  No  No  No  No  No  Yes 
This table shows regression results with interest rate (Panel A) and arrear occurrence (Panel B) as dependent 
variables. The table only shows the coefficient for the gender-gender interaction, all further control variables are 
as indicated in the table, but omitted to save space. Each regression also includes time, sector, sector-borrower, 
and sector-loan officer fixed effects. Standard errors that are clustered at the branch-sector level are shown in 
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Table 5: Own-gender bias and take up of second loan 
   Branch size 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  
Gender*Gender  -0.0694**  -0.0663*  -0.2360***  -0.0163 
   (0.0339)  (0.0341)  (0.0509)  (0.0295) 
  
Interest Rate  -0.9171***  -20.18* 
   (0.3172)  (12.22) 
  
F-test  7.93 
(0.008) 
P-value of Wald test  0.0000 
  
Adjusted R-squared  0.1965  0.1974  n.a.  0.2201  0.1862 
Observations  5,445  5,445  5,445  2,184  3,261 
This table shows regression results with loan take-up as dependent variable. Loan take-up is a dummy variable 
that takes on value one if borrowers returned to the bank for an additional loan application in case they had been 
granted a first loan. For this test, the sample period ends on December 31, 2006, less the mean maturity, which is 
563 days for all approved loans in the baseline sample. All regressions include the control variables that are 
included in column (4) of Table 4, the results for these are omitted to save space. Further, branch and sector 
trends are included where possible. In column (2), we include the interest rate as additional control variable. In 
column (3), we show 2SLS estimates with Gender*Gender as the excluded instrument and the interaction terms, 
the fixed effects, and the covariates as controls. F-test statistics (with p-values in parentheses). In columns (4) 
and (5), we split the sample according to the median number of loan officers by branch and year. Each regression 
also  includes  time,  sector,  sector-borrower,  and  sector-loan  officer  fixed  effects.  Standard  errors  that  are 
clustered at the branch-sector level are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 




Table 6: Own-gender bias and social distance 
   Young  Old  Young  Old   Low  High 
   borrowers  borrowers  loan officers  loan officers  experience  experience 
Panel A: Interest rate                   
Gender*Gender  0.0009  0.0041***  0.0051***  0.0008  0.0030**  0.0035*** 
   (0.0010)  (0.0014)  (0.0016)  (0.0014)  (0.0014)  (0.0011) 
                    
P-value of Wald test  0.0677     0.0488     0.8069    
                    
Adjusted R-squared  0.5389  0.5340  0.5147  0.5735  0.5525  0.6177 
Observations  3,940  3,945  4,045  3,840  4,153  3,732 
                    
Panel B: Arrears                   
Gender*Gender  0.0061  0.0230  0.0010  0.0215  0.0238*  -0.0100 
   (0.0245)  (0.0192)  (0.0238)  (0.0171)  (0.0121)  (0.0228) 
                    
P-value of Wald test  0.3792     0.3730     0.2029    
                    
Adjusted R-squared  0.0761  0.0947  0.0714  0.0912  0.0895  0.0795 
Observations  3,940  3,945  4,045  3,840  4,153  3,732 
This table shows regression results with interest rate (Panel A) and arrear occurrence (Panel B) as dependent 
variables. All regressions include the control variables that are included in column (4) of Table 4, the results for 
these are omitted to save space. Further, branch and sector trends are included where possible. In columns (1) 
and (2), the sample is split according to the median borrower age (41 years). In columns (3) and (4), the sample 
is split according to the median loan officer age (24 years). In columns (5) and (6), the sample is split according 
to the median loan officer experience measured as the number of loan applications handled by the respective loan 
officer (121 loan applications handled). Each regression also includes time, sector, sector-borrower, and sector-
loan officer fixed effects. Standard errors that are clustered at the branch-sector level are shown in parentheses. 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 7: Own-gender bias and competition 
   Competition  Young loan officers  Small branches 
   Low  High  Low competition  High competition  Low competition  High competition 
Panel A: Interest rate                   
Gender*Gender  0.0039***  0.0032**  0.0077***  0.0007  0.0097***  0.0031 
   (0.0013)  (0.0013)  (0.0024)  (0.0020)  (0.0021)  (0.0020) 
                    
P-value of Wald test  0.6618     0.0097     0.0157    
                    
Adjusted R-squared  0.4302  0.5486  0.4521  0.5260  0.3705  0.5676 
Observations  3,557  2,147  1,846  1,010  1,533  1,129 
                    
Panel B: Arrears                   
Gender*Gender  -0.0003  0.0393  -0.0030  0.0453  -0.0021  0.0342 
   (0.0212)  (0.0334)  (0.0277)  (0.0990)  (0.0323)  (0.0426) 
                    
P-value of Wald test  0.1255     0.5884     0.4186    
                    
Adjusted R-squared  0.0869  0.0926  0.0588  0.1103  0.0944  0.0380 
Observations  3,557  2,147  1,846  1,010  1,533  1,129 
This table shows regression results with interest rate (Panel A) and arrear occurrence (Panel B) as dependent variables. All regressions include the control variables that are included 
in column (4) of Table 4, the results for these are omitted to save space. Further, branch and sector trends are included where possible. In columns (1) and (2), the sample is split 
according to the median competition measured as the ratio of branches over population in a specific region and year for the time period 2004-2006. Columns (3) and (4) show 
regression results for below median age loan officers and for low and high competition. Columns (5) and (6) show regression results for below median size branches and for low and 
high competition. Each regression also includes time, sector, sector-borrower, and sector-loan officer fixed effects. Standard errors that are clustered at the branch-sector level are 
shown in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively. 